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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN COMPANY,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 14653

BASIL VETAS dba SIR BASIL'S,
Defendant and
Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

S'.rATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiff brought suit against defendant seeking
money damages for breach of a written rental agreement relating to custom-made electrical signs manufactured by
plaintiff for defendant.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court, sitting without a jury, rendered
judgment for plaintiff against defendant in the sum of
$1,112.54, $500.00 attorney's fees and plaintiff's costs
cf Sponsored
the action.
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff asks the Court to affirm the judgment of
the Trial Court and to award it its costs and attorney's
fees incurred in this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff agrees in part with the Statement of Facts
as set forth by defendant but feels several facts have been
omitted which are material to the issues here raised.

Plain-

tiff deems the important facts to be as follows:
On March 7, 1961, plaintiff and defendant entered
into a written rental agreement under the terms of which
plaintiff agreed to manufacture and install a custom-made
neon sign for defendant's drive-in restaurant located at
999 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah.

(Ex. 8-D).

Said agree-

ment required defendant to make monthly rental payments to
plaintiff at the rate of $110.00 per month.

As part of the

security for the performance by defendant of his obligations
under the agreement, the sum of $660.00 was deposited with
plaintiff.

Said sum was to be returned to defendant in the

event he performed all of his obligations under the lease.
Under the terms of the lease agreement, the title to the
sign remained in the plaintiff and plaintiff was obligated,
among other things, to maintain and keep the sign in good
repair.
in 1961.

The sign was duly built and installed by plaintiff
Subsequent thereto, defendant requested additional

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-2Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

signage from plaintiff.

Plaintiff and defendant entered into

a new rental agreement on the 20th day of January, 1963 (Ex.
9-D) under the terms of which defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $135.00 per month for the rental of the
combined sign package.

The terms and conditions of that

agreement were similar to the terms and conditions of the
previous rental agreement.

Defendant's security deposit was

transferred to the new agreement.

Pursuant to defendant's

request and specifications, plaintiff thereafter manufactured
certain overhanging plexiglas panels and installed the same
on defendant's premises.
Subsequent to 1963 the subject signs were damaged
in a windstorm.

Under the maintenance provisions of the con-

tract, plaintiff was required to expend the approximate
sum of $2,000.00 to repair and restore the damaged signs
(R-90, 102).
By November of 1967, defendant's business was not
doing well.

Defendant thereupon contacted Mr. Robert Gilbert,

manager of plaintiff's Ogden office and requested that something be done to reduce the monthly sign payments so as to
increase the cash flow in defendant's business (R-72, 149,
151).

At the time the request was made, defendant was de-

linquent in his payments to plaintiff under the previous
rental agreewent in the sum of $558.9 2.

(Ex. 1-P) •

Pursuant

to the request of defendant, plaintiff and defendant entered
into a third rental agreement relating to the subject signs,
(Ex. 2-P), the terms and conditions of which were similar

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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to the two previous agreements.

It is this third rental agree-

ment which forms the basis of the law suit.
Under the terms of the subject rental agreement,
defendant agreed to pay plaintiff the sum of $99.17

1

per

month for each and every calendar month for a period of 96
months with all rentals to be paid monthly in advance.

Pay-

ment was to begin on December 1, 1967 (Finding No. 2, R-57).
The lease agreement was not only for the use of the signs by
defendant but also imposed upon plaintiff the burden of upkeep and maintenance of the signs

(Finding No. 6, R-57).

The contract provided that in the event of any failure of
the defendant to pay any installment of the rental called
for at the time provided, plaintiff had the right to terminate the agreement and, in addition thereto, to repossess
the signs (Ex. 2-P) •

Defendant agreed to pay a reasonable

attorney's fee in the event of suit after default (Finding
No. 2, R-57).

On disputed evidence the Court found that the

defendant's security deposit was applicable to this agreement.
Paragraph 8 of the subject agreement provided as
follows:
" ( 8)
It is agreed by the parties hereto
that the SIGN is of special construction made
for the uses and purposes of lessee and no
other, and that except for use by lessee, the
SIGN has no value.
Lessee agrees that in the
1 The price was arrived at by combining the remaining
balance due under contract #2
with plaintiff's standard
renewal rate of 60% and extending the payments over 96 months.
In making the calculations, however, Gilbert by error underSponsored by the
S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
for digitization
provided by the
Institute of Museum
and Library
Services
stated
the
rentals
byFunding
some
$1,300.00
(R-72-73,
76,
80-81).
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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event he shall be in default in the payment
of rental when due or shall fail to perform
any other of his obligations hereunder, he
shall be indebted to, and hereby agrees to pay
to lessor forthwith, in addition to the full
rental for such time as lessee retains possession of the SIGN, liquidated damages for
his breach hereunder in an amount equal to
three-fourths of the balance of the rental
payable hereunder, whether the same may be
due or not.
The parties hereto agree that in
such event, the said three-fourths of the balance of the rental payable hereunder is and
will be fair and reasonable compensation for
the damage to lessor arising from such breach
by lessee. • • "
Defendant proceeded to make installment payments
under the subject contract but experienced some difficulty
in doing so.

In order to help defendant, plaintiff corn-

rnenced purchasing gasoline from him and allowed him a
credit against his monthly payments for the gasoline purchases

(R. 103).

In spite of the efforts by plaintiff, de-

fendant became delinquent in his payments to plaintiff ln
September of 1970
sporadic payments

(Ex.
2

5-D) •

'I'hereafter, defendant made

and his delinquency gradually increased

until, as of December 1, 1973, defendant owed plaintiff the
sum of $691.19
Ex. 6-P) •

for delinquent rentals

(Finding No. 4, R-57,

A demand letter was sent to defendant requesting

that the account be brought current and that upon his failure
to do so certain legal steps would be initiated by plaintiff.
On December 26, 1973, defendant made one monthly payment of
2 Paragraph 9 of the contract states, "Time is of the
essence of this agreement. Acceptance by Lessor of a late
payment shall not be construed as a waiver of Lessor's right
to have each subsequent payment made on the due date thereof."
(Ex. 2-P).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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$103.63

(Ex. 5-D, R-113), reducing the delinquent rental

balance owed to plaintiff at that time to $587.54.

No pay-

ments were received by plaintiff from defendant after December 26, 1973 (Finding No. 4, R-57).

On February l, 1974,

suit was commenced by plaintiff against defendant for breach
of the December 1967 rental agreement.

Plaintiff sought all

sums in arrears plus liquidated damages on the remaining contract balance and attorney's fees.
session of the signs.

Defendant retained pos-

On June 11, 1974, plaintiff attempted

to reclaim the signs but defendant refused to allow it to do
so (R-40).

Defendant continued in business on the premises

until October 15, 1974 (R-152).

Since the signs were custom-

made for defendant, plaintiff was unable to negotiate a new
lease on the signs with subsequent occupants of the premises
(R-74).

In February of 1975 plaintiff removed the signs to

its junk yard where they remained at the time of trial (R-78).
ARGUMENT
Point I
ON APPEAL, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE PRESUMED
CORRECT.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Trial Court
took the matter under advisement; subsequently it entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R-56-58).

The

Findings of the Trial Court should be dispositive of this
appeal.

Among other things the Court found that:
l.

The deposit of $660.00 was to be returned to

defendant in the event that defendant performed all of his

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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obligations under the rental agreement, but that defendant
failed to so perform (Finding No. 3, R-57).
2.

On December 1, 1973, defendant was in material

default under the terms of the contract and there was due
to plaintiff from defendant the sum of $691.17.

On December

26, 1973, plaintiff received from defendant the sum of
$103.63, which was applied toward the accrued delinquency,
but no payments were received by plaintiff from defendant
subsequent to that date
3.

(Finding No. 4, R-57).

The signs were unique chattels constructed and

designed especially for use on the lessee's premises
No.

(Finding

5, R-57).
4.

Plaintiff was not in breach of the terms of the

agreement with defendant and properly maintained the signs
and did such other things as it was required to do under
the rental agreement
5.

(Finding No. 8, R-57).

The actual damages caused by the breach of the

agreement by defendant were difficult to accurately estimate
at the time the subject lease was executed by the parties
and the amount stipulated in the lease agreement for liquidated damages bears a reasonable relation to the damages
actually sustained by plaintiff (Finding No. 9, R-58).
Upon appeal the evidence must be viewed in a light
most favorable to sustain the Trial Court.

The Findings

come to this Court endowed with a presumption of validity
and correctness and will not be disturbed unless they are
clearly contrary to the evidence; the appellant must sustain
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
-7-

the burden of showing error.

Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Ut.2d

251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972); Lynch v. McDonald, 12 Ut.2d 427,
367 P.2d 464

(1962); Carlton v. Hackett, 11 Ut.2d 389, 360

P.2d 176 (1961).
Plaintiff submits that the Findings of the Trial
court are adequately supported by the evidence as set forth
hereafter and must be sustained by this Court on appeal.
POINT II
DEFENDANT WAS IN MATERIAL DEFAULT UNDER THE TERMS
OF THE CONTRACT AND THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT RELATING
THERETO MUST BE SUSTAINED.
The evidence is undisputed that on December 1, 1973,
defendant was delinquent in his payments to plaintiff in the
sum of $691.17

(Finding No. 4, R-57, 125, Ex. 1-P), a sum

in excess of his security deposit.
Defendant himself ack3
nowledges this fact (R-148) •
Defendant argues, however,
that he was not in default because a subsequent payment by
him made his accrued rental delinquency less than the security deposit held by plaintiff.
The rental agreement provided that as part security
for the performance by lessee of his obligations the sum of
$660.00 was to be deposited with lessor.

The document fur-

ther provided that "in the event lessee shall have performed
all of his obligations hereunder, such deposit is to be
3

Defendant in his brief states it is not disputed
that at the end of December he was in arrears five payments
(Brief of Appellant, page 4).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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returned."

(Ex. 2-Pl.

The Trial Court found, and properly

so, that defendant had failed to perform all of his obligations under the agreement (Finding No. 3, R-57), and, therefore, was not entitled to a return of the security deposit.
The mere fact that the defendant gave plaintiff a
security deposit does not relieve defendant of his obligation
to make the monthly payments on the lease as they accrue.
Barlow v.

Hoffman, 103 Colo. 286, 86 P.2d 239 (1938).

the terms of the subject

agreemen~

Under

defendant, upon his breach,

became obligated to plaintiff for the full rentals for such
time as he retained possession of the sign and, in addition
thereto, three-fourths of the remaining contract balance
(Ex. 2-P, Finding No. 2, R-57); therefore, on December 1,
1973, defendant's obligation to plaintiff amounted to $2,401.85,
a sum greatly in excess of the amount of his security deposit.

Even if the sums owed by defendant were less than

his deposit defendant would still be in breach of the agreement.
Where, as in this case, money is deposited as security for the performance of a lease, the lessor is entitled to
retain the deposit until the lessee has completely discharged
all of his obligations.
52 (Cal. App. 1952).

Garfinkle v. Montgomery, 248 P.2d

As was stated therein:

4 $99.17 x 23 months x 75% = $1,710.68 + $691.17 =
$2,401.85.
If defendant was obligated for the full rentals
for such time as he retained possession of the sign, as the
contract provides, defendant's indebtedness would have been
greater. In calculating the above figure, however, defendant
was Sponsored
only by"charged"
the remaining
contract
balance.
the S.J. Quinney Lawfor
Library. 75%
Fundingof
for digitization
provided by the Institute
of Museum and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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4

"The lessor is entitled to retain the
deposited fund until complete discharge by
the lessee of the obligations the performance of which the deposit is shown to have
been intended to secure. " ( Id. at 57) •
If the lessee fails to perform his obligations, lessor is
entitled to recover his damages and if actual damages exceed
the deposit, the entire deposit may be retained and the
additional damages recovered.

If the actual damages are

less than the deposit, the remaining portion may be reclaimed
by lessee.

5 Williston, Contracts (3d) ~90, p. 768.

also Boral v. Caldwell, 35 Cal. Rptr. 689

(1964).

See

Thus, in

the instant case, defendant was entitled to a full return
of the deposit only if he fully performed his obligations;
otherwise, as the Trial Court found, plaintiff was entitled
to apply the deposit against its damages.
Since a security deposit must be returned to the
extent that it exceeds the actual damages incurred, it
follows inescapably that one can be in default under a contract although the amount of the default is less than the
deposit.

See Garfinkle v. Montgomery, supra.
In the instant case defendant had few obligations

other than to make his monthly payments.
failed to do.

This defendant

Defendant's failure to pay the accrueing in-

stallments when due placed him in breach of his contractual
obligations with

pl~intiff.

17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts, §429.

The subsequent payment of one month's accrued delinquency
cannot excuse

defendant's breach.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Although defendant had no right to require plaintiff
to utilize the deposit to off-set his accrued delinquen~J,
it is interesting to note that he made no request of plain~~at

tiff

the deposit be so applied (R-152), even though he

had received repeated demands that he bring his account
current (R-152).

Defendant should not now be heard to com-

plain that plaintiff's failure to do that which it was not
~~d

required to do

that which defendant had not even re-

quested i-:: :io shoc:ld absolve defendant from the consequences
of his cwn actions.
As of December of 1963
the contract at
re~ining

for a

~~e ~n~~ly

~~ere

remained 23 months of

payment of $99.17 plus sales tax

balance due under the contract of S2,2B0.9l

3y ::'ebr·.1ary 1, 1974, the date suit was i:-.st.:.-:,.:-:ed,

(R-113).

the nini=·-= accr'.led rental delinquency was $736.30 ($69l.i7 +
(99.17 x 2 x

=ade no

defendan~

retained
whic~
~'1e

i~s

~e

:ac~

75~]

~e

~.a-:.

- 103.63).
f'.lr~her

~

sec;;.r::'.-:.~·

-:...':e

December 26, 1973,

payments on the sign although he

ceased doing business (R-152).

In spite of

defe:-.dant continued to use the sign and paid

::;~-:.:.:::::-.,

de~cs:.-:.

a-:.

retrcscec-:. sees ___ ,
tic:-.s.

to

·..:se and ;:as session until October of 1974, at

no f·..:r-:...'".er re:-.-:.a:..s c::
give

Subsequent

i~,

he ·.vould now like this Court to

a-:. :-.:.s sole discretion, of applying his
a:-.~-~

sta;e of the agreement as he, in
cff-set the accrued rental obliga-

::-.is :-.e a5:-:5, :.:-. s:;i te of the fact that he never re-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the instant case there was a dispute in the testimony concerning the disposition of the security deposit.
The Trial Court found in favor of the defendant on that
point and allowed defendant to credit the security deposit
against the judgment.

The plaintiff testified that a journal

entry was made regarding the deposit in order to partially
correct the mistake that had been made in the calculation of
the subject contract (R-122-123).

Mr. Gilbert, testified

that the transfer was made after consultation with defendant
(R-86).

The defendant denied that he had ever been so in-

formed by plaintiff.

Plaintiff's records were in a state of

disarray due to the transfer of its bookkeeping functions
from Ogden to Salt Lake City.

The Court held there was

insufficient evidence for it to determine precisely what had
happened to the deposit.
Defendant now attempts to have its cake and eat it
too with regards to the security deposit.

Defendant was

more than agreeable to off-set the deposit against the judgment awarded to plaintiff and yet now argues that the deposit
had, in fact, been previously appropriated by plaintiff.
The only manner in which it could have been utilized was to
partially off-set the contract miscalculation (R-82, 121,
136).

Plaintiff submits that if the deposit had, in fact,

been utilized by it as its witnesses indicated, no off-set
should be credited against the judgment since the "deposit"
would be non-existent.

If, however, as the Court found, a

credit against the judgment is proper, there can be no claim

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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that the security deposit had been appropriated by plainntiff.

The Court found on disputed testimony that it could

not determine the disposition of the deposit, therefore
defendant was entitled to have the deposit applied towards
the obligation owed to plaintiff.

Although plaintiff con-

tends that there is evidence to support a contrary conclusion, it must abide by the findings of the court.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT IN BREACH OF ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER
THE LEASE AGREEMENT.
Defendant claims that plaintiff actually breached
the terms of the contract since it failed to maintain the
subject sign after December 1, 1973 (Appellant's Brief,
page 6).

Although there was some dispute in the testimony

concerning the maintenance of the signs; the Trial Court
found that plaintiff had not breached the terms of its
agreement, and further found that plaintiff had properly
maintained the signs and did such other things as it was
required to do under the terms of the rental agreement
(Finding No. 8, R-57).

Mr. Garth Hess, the service manager for plaintiff,
testified that defendant's signs were included upon a nightly
sign patrol (R-100), and Lhat the signs were properly maintained (R-101, 104-105).

Mr. Hess further stated that he

didn't remember receiving any complaints from the defendant
5 It is the duty of the Trial Court to resolve any conflicts in the testimony. McKaren v. Merrill, 15 Ut.2d 179,
Sponsored
by the732
S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
389
P.2d
(1964).
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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regarding the maintenance on the signs (R-102, 103), although
he saw the defendant frequently (R-103-104).

When the signs

were removed he had occasion to review their condition and
found that there was nothing wrong with them (R-104).

In

support of his contention that plaintiff had not maintained
the signs, the defendant testified that subsequent to the
time that suit was initiated by plaintiff, the signs "didn't
light up."

Defendant estimated that this occurred possibly

in March or April of 1974 (R-147).

Defendant further in-

dicated that there was some paint peeling on the bottom of
the panel.

All of defendant's complaints regarding the

condition of the signs, however, relate to conditions that
occurred subsequent to the time defendant breached the rental
agreement and at a time when defendant's accrued monthly
delinquency was, at a minimum, in excess of $800.00.

The

lessee's material breach in failing to pay his rental obligations excused plaintiff from further performance under the
contract.

See Young Electric Sign Co. v. Fohrman, 466

P.2d 846 (Nev. 1970): Restatement of Contracts,

§397

(1932).

Under the terms of the agreement, plaintiff, upon
defendant's default, had the right to immediately repossess
the signs and, in addition, to collect liquidated damages
for the remainder of the contract term.

The subsequent

failure of the signs to properly function cannot be considered
a breach of the contract since, by its terms, plaintiff
could have completely removed the signs from defendant's
premises prior to the time they ceased to function properly.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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C£ Young Electric Sign Co. v Fehrman, supra.

In the in-

stant case, defendant at least had the use of the signs during
the day, whereas, had plaintiff exercised its rights under
the contract and repossessed the signs, defendant would not
have had any use of the signs.
It is interesting to note that plaintiff attempted
to repossess the signs on June 11, 1974, but that defendant
refused to allow plaintiff to do so (R-40).

Defendant, at

that time, maintained that the signs were still of some value
to him since he was still operating his business at that
location (R-43).

Defendant refused to pay plaintiff the

sums due under the rental agreement, refused to allow plaintiff to repossess the signs, and continued to have the use
of the signs at his business.

Although defendant would not

pay the rentals on them, he felt that the signs still had some
value to him, but now asks this Court to find that in spite
of these failures to pay the rent when due, plaintiff nevertheless had a duty to continue to maintain the signs and to
incur additional expenses relating to them without a corresponding obligation on the part of defendant to 'nake the
monthly payments.

such a contention is contrary to the de-

cided law on this point.

Young Electric Sign Co. v. Fehrman,

supra.
The evidence is clear; plaintiff performed its duty
and defendant breached his.

The findings of the Trial Court

are amply supported by the evidence.
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Point IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IS
REASONABLE AND MUST BE SUSTAINED BY THIS COURT.
As previously set forth,

the rental agreement pro-

vided for liquidated damages upon defendant's breach equal
to three-fourths of the remaining contract balance.

The

law of this state is to the effect that where the parties to
a contract stipulate to the amount of liquidated damages
that will be paid in case of a breach, such a stipulation is
generally enforceable.
P.2d 446 (1952).

Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Ut. 468, 243

In the instant case defendant had entered

into three agreements with plaintiff relating to the signs
each of which contained an identical provision calling for
liquidated damages in the event of defendant's breach (Ex.
2-P, 8-D, 9-D).

Since the Trial Court adopted the measure

of damages defendant had agreed to, defendant should not
now be heard to complain.

See Ray v. Electrical Products

Consolidated, 390 P.2d 607

(Wyo. 1964).

A large portion of the electrical signs in the
industry are custom-made and maintenance is often included
in the lease thereof, thereby making an accurate forecast of
actual damages difficult.

As a consequence, a provision for

liquidated damages is common in rental agreements in the
sign industry.

These provisions have generally been upheld

by the courts.

See Young Electric Sign Co. v. Capps, 94 Id.

518, 492 P.2d 57

(1971) and Young Electric Sign Co. v.

Fohrman, supra, upholding identical provisions to the one
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here in question, Ray v. Electrical Products Consolidated,
supra, 75% clause upheld; Mosier v. Woodell, 189 Wash. 583,
66 P.2d 353 (1937), 80% clause upheld; Bassett v. Claude
Neon Federal Co., 65 F. 2d 526 (lOth Cir. 1933), 75% clause
upheld; Lamson Co. v. Elliott-Taylor-Woolfenden Co., 25
F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1928), 80% clause upheld.
Defendant states, and plaintiff agrees, that an award
of liquidated damages must fit within the requirements of
Section 339, Restatement of Law of contracts.

That section

provides:
"[A)n agreement made in advance of breach,
fixing the damages therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect the
damages recoverable for the breach unless
(a) the amount so fixed is a reasonable
forecast of the harm that is caused by the
breach and
(b) the harm that is caused by the breach
is one that is incapable or very difficult of
accurate estimation." Restatement of Contracts,
§339 (1932).
In the instant case, the Court specifically found
that the actual damages caused by a breach of the agreement
by defendant were difficult to actually estimate at the time
the subject lease was executed by the parties

9, R-58).

(Finding No.

Plaintiff submits that there is ample evidence to

support this conclusion.

The evidence showed that the signs

were custom-made neon signs constructed and designed especially for use on the lessee's premises
R-57).

(Finding No. 5,

The rental agreement provided that "it is agreed by

the partj es hereto that the sign is of special construction
made for ·the uses and purposes of Lessee and no other, and
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that except for use by Lessee the sign has no value. "
(Paragraph 8 of Ex. 2-P) •

Mr. Robert Gilbert testified that

plaintiff attempted to mitigate its damages by dealing with
several other parties relating to the signs, but that the
signs could not be used by subsequent tenants of the premises because they were custom-built for defendant (R-141).
Plaintiff ultimately removed the signs to its junkyard (R78).

When removal of the signs was sought by plaintiff,

defendant took the position that the signs were of "some
value" to him, but that they had no value to plaintiff (R43).

When dealing with this precise issue and the precise

contract presented here, the Supreme Court of Idaho, in
resolving the question in favor of plaintiff, stated:
"Since the value of signs themselves is
questionable, it follows that computation of
the actual damages to Young Electric is 'in
capable or very difficult of accurate estimation'." Young Electric Sign Co. v. Capps,
supra.
There is, however, additional evidence to support the
Trial Court's Finding.

The subject rental agreement was not

only for the use of the signs by defendant but also imposed
upon plaintiff the burden of upkeep and maintenance
No. 6, R-57).

(Finding

A portion of the compensation plaintiff was

to receive from defendant under the rental agreement was
for services as well as for the use of the signs.

Testimony

indicated that prior to the execution of the subject contract the signs had been severely damaged in a windstorm and
that Young Electric, under its duty to maintain the signs,
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had, on that occasion, expended the approximate sum of
$2,000.00 in repairing a portion of the subject signs (R-90,
102).

Other than the windstorm, however, the signs, through

their life, had required only standard maintenance (R-107).
Robert Krantz, the credit manager for plaintiff, testified
that during the year 1973 plaintiff had only been required
to expend the sum of $175.00 for the maintenance of the signs
(R-128, Ex. 7-P).

It is obvious that plaintiff could not

look into the future and could not determine in advance
whether the signs would be damaged by wind, vandalism or any
other cause, or whether the signs would weather properly or
require a large amount of painting or other maintenance.

Thus,

it is clear that the actual damages caused by breach of the
agreement were sufficiently difficult to ascertain at
the time the contract was signed.

The testimony is uncon-

troverted in this respect and the Trial Court specifically
so found

(Find1ng No. 9, R-58).
Since the damages were sufficiently difficult to

estimate at the time the contract was entered into, the only
remaining impediment to plaintiff's award of liquidated
damages is the question of whether they bear a reasonable
relation to the damages actually sustained.

In this regard,

the Trial Court made a specific finding that the amount
stipulated in the lease for liquidated damages did bear a
reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained by the
plaintiff (Finding No. 9, R-58).
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In attempting to attack the Court's specific finding,
defendant has misconstrued the evidence that was presented.
Defendant here contends that the maintenance cost of the
sign amounted to $50.00 per month and that taxes and insurance each amounted to an additional $15.00 per month.
a contention is clearly erroneous.

Such

The testimony is undis-

puted that the figures relied upon by defendant were ruleof-thumb estimates used by plaintiff to allocate the charges
made to defendant and were not the actual expenses incurred
6
by Young Electric (R-96, 129).
The figures were, in fact,
arrived at subsequent to the date the contract was executed
(R-96, 139) and were not the basis upon which the parties
contracted.

7

The actual expenses incurred by Young Electric with
relation to the subject sign amounted to $175.00 for maintenance for the year 1973 (R-114) and $3.75 per month for
property taxes

(R-135).

The testimony indicated that plain-

tiff was self-insured in relation to property damage (R-116)
and had a blanket policy of liability coverage on all of its
signs.

Defendant states, and plaintiff agrees, that the

cost of the liability insurance as it related to the subject signs could not be great (Defendant's brief, page 7).
6
Mr. Gilbert testified that the actual expense might
have been much greater or much less than the $50.00 budgeted
amount (R-96).
7
In Ray v. Electrical Products Consolidated, supra,
lessee also
attempted to utilize cost allowances rather
than the actual expenses.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

The uncontroverted evidence indicates that plaintiff's
actual out-of-pocket expenses for the signs, as opposed to
its budgeted or estimated expenses, amounted to $14.58 per
month for maintenance ($175.00

7 12)

and $3.75 per month for

taxes, making the total monthly expense $18.33.
In determining the reasonableness of the 75% provision it is important to remember that the purpose and
function of this Court is to place the injured party so far
as is possible in a position no better or no worse than he
would have occupied had the contract been performed.

Young

Electric Sign Co. v. Capps, supra: Ray v. Electrical Products
Consolidated, supra.
The evidence indicated that Young Electric made a
reasonable effort to mitigate its damages by re-letting the
signs: further, the Trial Court awarded damages to plaintiff
only for such time as the plaintiff had not entered into a
subsequent rental agreement with the subsequent occupant of
.
8
the prem1.ses.
Plaintiff agrees that it is obligated to give defendant credit for the saved expenses which it did not
incur because the breach by lessee relieved it from further
performance.

Young Electric Sign Company v. Capps, supra.

In applying this principle, plaintiff's damages would be
computed by establishing the total unpaid rentals
per month) less the saved monthly expenses

($99.17

($14.58 maintenance

8Although the defendant's signs were required to be
removed, plaintiff was able to use a portion of the sign
structure and entered into a new contract with a subsequent
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+ $3.75 taxes= $18.33), which results in net damages to
plaintiff of $80.84 per month ($99.17 - $18.33).

Since the

Trial court awarded liquidated damages to plaintiff in the
sum of $74.25 per month (Finding No. 11, R-58), the liquidated damages as awarded are actually less than plaintiff's
actual damages and hence must be reasonable and proper.
The evidence is undisputed, however, that plaintiff's
obligation to pay taxes and insurance on the signs continued
through 1974 to the end of that year (R-92) and, indeed, that
the taxes were paid additionally through 1975 (R-134).

9

Thus

it appears that the only "saved expense" occasioned by defendant's breach of contract was the maintenance expense
which had averaged $14.58 per month.

Thus the actual dam-

ages caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach were really
$84.59 per month ($99.17 - $14.58), some $10.00 more than was
actually awarded to plaintiff under the liquidated damages
provision.

Plaintiff submits there is ample evidence to sup-

port the Trial Court's finding that the liquidated damages as
awarded by the Trial Court bore a reasonable relationship to
the actual damages incurred by plaintiff.

In construing this

precise contract two other courts have similarly concurred.
Young Electric Sign Co. v. Capps, supra; Young Electric Sign
Company v. Fohrman, supra.

Plaintiff submits that the require-

ments of Section 339 were met and that the award of liquidated
9 since defendant refused to allow plaintiff to repossess the signs plaintiff was forced to maintain insurance and
pay property taxes on those signs subsequent thereto.
Therefore, defendant cannot now complain that he does not get credit
for these expenses which normally would be saved but which in
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damages must be sustained by this Court.
Point V
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER A REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEE ON THIS APPEAL.
The lease agreement upon which plaintiff relies
provides as follows:
"In the event this agreement is placed
by Lessor in the hands of an attorney after
default for enforcement or collection, Lessee
will pay a reasonable attorney's fee." (Para-·
graph 8, Ex. 2-P).
Since the agreement provides for the award of attorney's
fees such an award is proper under the laws of this state.
Holland v. Brown, 15 Ut.2d 422, 394 P.2d 77
v. Perry, 123 Ut.l6, 253 P.2d 312

(1953).

(1964); Hawkins
The Trial Court

found that $500.00 was a reasonable sum to be awarded plaintiff for its legal costs to date

(Finding No. 12, R-58).

Plaintiff submits that since it prevailed in the
Trial Court that if that judgment is affirmed herein, as
plaintiff insists it must be, it should be allowed to recover from appellant its attorney's fees on this appeal pursuant to the terms of the contract.

Such an award is not

only proper, Young Electric Sign Co. v. Capps, supra, but is
necessary to allow plaintiff to recover the full benefit of
its bargain.
CONCLUSION
The Findings of Fact are clearly supported by ample
evidence.

Appellant cannot meet his burden of showing clear
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error on the part of the Trial Court.

Defendant refused to

make his monthly payments under the lease agreement and became
in material default thereunder.

Upon defendant's breach,

plaintiff had the right to immediately repossess the signs,
and defendant became indebted not only for the delinquent
rentals but for 75% of the remaining contract balance.

Defen-

dant's breach relieved plaintiff of its duty to further maintain the signs.

The Trial Court specifically found that the

liquidated damages provision of the contract was reasonable
and met the requirements of the Restatement of Contracts,
Section 339.

This precise contract has been upheld by the

Supreme Courts of Idaho and Nevada and similar liquidated
damages clauses are recognized throughout the sign industry.
The mere existence of a security deposit does not relieve
defendant of his obligations under the contract.

Such a

deposit is given to secure performance, not in lieu thereof.
Defendant was entitled to the full return of his deposit only
if he completely performed all of his contractual obligations.
This defendant failed to do, therefore the deposit could properly be applied by plaintiff to partially off-set the damages
caused to it by defendant's breach.
The Findings of the Trial Court are amply supported
by the evidence.

Plaintiff contends, therefore, that the

judgment of the Trial Court must be affirmed and that plaintiff should be awarded reasonable attorney's fees on this
appeal pursuant to the terms of the subject contract.
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Respectfully submitted,
EARL D. TANNER & ASSOCIATES

By_ _-:;J;-.---=T~h-o_m_a_s-...,B""o_w_e_n_ _ _ __
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Respondent
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent
to Richard

w.

Campbell, Attorney for Appellant, this

day

of December, 1976.

J. Thomas Bowen
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